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Abstract 
 
 
The Natural Resource Curse literature proposes to explain why and to what extent resource-
wealthy countries have poor economic growth outcomes. Most research focuses on direct 
economic explanations, considering the role of governing institutions exogenously if at all. One 
emerging branch of explanations attempts to address this shortcoming, focusing on the indirect 
effects of institutional deterioration on economic outcomes in resource-rich countries. I add to 
this emerging literature by performing an econometric analysis of 16 oil-producing nations, 
examining the impact of national oil rent dependency on 12 dimensions of government quality 
from 1987-2008. I find that oil dependency has a significant negative impact on government 
quality in 11 of the 12 dimensions. I also find that controlling for preexisting levels of 
democracy does not significantly mitigate institutional resource curse effects. This runs counter 
to findings about economic effects, which tend to disappear when democracy levels are high. 
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A. Introduction 
 
This paper is motivated by the desire to reexamine two economic concepts. The first is modern 
national accounting, particularly the gross national product/gross domestic product paradigm 
with which so many, non-economists included, are now so familiar. The second is not quite as 
well known, except to economists, political scientists, and international development scholars, 
but plays a more central role in this study. It is known as the natural resource curse, or simply the 
resource curse. Consideration of these two concepts has led me to examine the impact of oil 
stock depletion on the quality of governance and institutions. Essentially, this paper proposes and 
investigates a new natural resource curse- natural capital stock depletion reducing the quality of 
governance- by making use of a criticism of national accounts. It then examines a detail of the 
proposed relationship, asking whether or not high preexisting quality of government and 
institutions is an effective safeguard against possible institutional resource curse effects. 
 
 
"Our gross national product ... if we should judge America by that - counts air 
pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of 
carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for those who break 
them. It counts the destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural 
wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and the cost of a nuclear warhead, 
and armored cars for police who fight riots in our streets. It counts Whitman's 
rifle and Speck's knife, and the television programs which glorify violence in 
order to sell toys to our children. 
 
 "Yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, 
the quality of their education, or the joy of their play. It does not include the 
beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages; the intelligence of our 
public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit 
nor our courage; neither our wisdom nor our learning; neither our compassion 
nor our devotion to our country; it measures everything, in short, except that 
which makes life worthwhile. And it tells us everything about America except 
why we are proud that we are Americans." 
 
-Robert F. Kennedy Address, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, March 
18, 1968 !
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A.1. Critiquing GDP 
 
The common national accounting constructs GDP and GNP are criticized for a number of 
reasons. Most economists will acknowledge that the current system of national accounting is not 
perfect, and that GDP, for example, is simply one indicator of national wellbeing, rather than a 
precise quantification of it. Although many protest at the extent to which GDP is used to measure 
national progress in the United States, economists will often point out that GDP and GNP are in 
fact designed to measure economic output and nothing more. While economists are rightfully 
wary of the suggestion that such measures be used as proxies for levels of wellbeing or progress, 
most would argue that the accounts actually serve their original purpose quite adequately.  
 
Even as accounts of national production, however, GDP and GNP are often criticized for 
particular flaws. One criticism in particular has grown in prominence with the modern 
environmental movement. I shall refer to this argument as the natural capital stock (NCS) 
critique (although it is also known as the “genuine savings” argument). Robert F. Kennedy’s 
1968 speech at the University of Kansas, quoted in the opening of this paper, contains an 
eloquent expression of environmentalists’ basic objection to national accounting: “It counts the 
destruction of our redwoods and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl.” Refining this 
imprecise observation, the NCS critique points out that GDP measurement is fundamentally 
flawed by the failure to account for the reduction in capital stock represented by any harvesting 
of nonrenewable capital resources. 
 
When a company prepares its annual accounting figures, it must report any reductions in its 
capital stock- say the collapse of a robot that manufactures cars, or the permanent flooding of a 
warehouse. Such reductions in capital stock undermine the overall economic value of the 
company by limiting production potential for the future; instead of focusing on increasing 
productivity, the company must instead replenish its capital stock just to maintain production 
levels. Resources such as coal, oil, gold and diamonds are a form of natural capital, and the stock 
of such resources is reduced in a very non-abstract manner, namely mining and subsequent 
transformation into a good (jewelry) or service (energy). In the reported GDPs and GNPs of 
nations, the value of any produced jewelry and energy is included, but the accompanying 
reduction in capital stock is simply ignored. The NCS critique points out that, like the company 
with depreciated equipment, nations with depleted capital stocks must divert time and money 
away from increased productivity toward the restoration of that stock, or face declining incomes 
in the future. Further, nonrenewable natural resources cannot be restored, and so this particular 
form of capital depreciation leads to a permanent reduction in incomes.  
 
Attempts to make use of the NCS critique have arisen from private and public actors. They can 
often be seen as one form of ‘Green GDP,’ which itself is a broad term. Attempts to calculate 
Green GDP are diverse, and often focus on a range of issues other than natural capital stock.1 
Nonetheless, it is possible to conceive of a Green GDP for nations, or even the world, created by 
adjusting the normal figures down to account for depletion of natural capital stocks. Scholars !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!China, for example, experimented in the mid 2000s by publishing a Green GDP that revised GDP 
figures by subtracting the cost of pollution from economic activities. The figures were so alarming that 
the experiment was discontinued after one publication.!
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have performed these calculations for certain resources, both in specific countries and for the 
world as a whole.  
 
The first attempts to use this method came from Repetto et al. (1987), and Solorzano et al. 
(1991), of the World Resources Institute, performing studies of the Indonesian and Costa Rican 
economies, respectively. The results of attempts to adjust Indonesia national accounts for 
resource consumption are illustrated in the table below, reproduced from the original publication.  
 
Table 1.  Comparison of GDP and Depletion-Adjusted Domestic Product (DADP) for Indonesia, 1971-84 
(in billions of 1973 Rupiah) 
Year GDP 
Net Loss in 
petroleum 
sector 
Net loss in 
forestry 
sector 
Net loss in 
soil sector 
Net resource 
depreciation DADP 
1971 5545 -1527 312 89 -1126 6671 
1972 6067 -337 354 83 100 6176 
1973 6753 -407 591 95 279 7032 
1974 7296 -3228 533 90 -2605 4691 
1975 7631 787 249 85 1121 8752 
1976 8256 187 423 7 684 8840 
1977 8882 1225 405 81 1711 10,593 
1978 9567 1117 401 89 1607 11,174 
1979 10,165 1200 946 73 2219 12,384 
1980 11,169 1633 965 65 2663 13,832 
1981 12,055 1552 595 68 2215 14,270 
1982 12,325 1158 551 55 1764 14,089 
1983 12,842 1825 974 71 2870 15,712 
1984 13,520 1765 493 76 2334 15,854 
Total     15,836  
Avg. Annual 
Growth 
7.1%     4.0% 
Source: Repetto et al., (1989), p.6. 
 
The authors consider losses in stock of oil, forest and soil- some observations are negative 
because of discovery of new resource reserves. These discoveries actually make the adjusted 
GDP (DADP) higher than standard GDP in many years. The authors also show that annual 
DADP growth is, on average, 3.1% slower than annual GDP growth- implying that productivity 
in Indonesia grew much more slowly over this time period than GDP might suggest. Studies such 
as those performed by the scholars at WRI often have interesting results, illustrating that some 
nations’ GDP figures are in no way illustrative of the long-term health of their economies. They 
contain subtleties and raise questions that I will discuss at length later on. The most important 
implication of these studies and others, for the purposes of this paper, is that revision of national 
accounts to compensate for natural capital depletion is often an enlightening exercise that has the 
potential to raise important questions about the trajectories of national economies. 
 
A.2. Exploring the Natural Resource Curse 
 
The second major economic concept involved in this paper is the so-called natural resource 
curse. The debate surrounding the resource curse concerns whether, and under what 
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circumstances, the abundance of natural resources actually proves to be a cause of poor 
economic performance, low growth rates, and low per capita incomes. For reasons that are fairly 
intuitive resource wealth would be expected, at first glance, to be greatly beneficial to national 
economies. Because this has not always been the case, the relationship between resource 
abundance and economic outcomes has been under consideration for decades.  
 
Sachs and Warner, in a series of influential 1990s papers, were the first to postulate the modern 
formulation of the negative relationship between natural resource abundance and national 
economic performance. Since that time a great deal of work has been done supporting, refuting 
or refining the initial claims. Many subtleties and caveats have been exposed or suggested, and 
so research into the exact mechanics of the resource curse is ongoing; interesting new concepts 
arise frequently. I will focus on one in particular- the role of governing institutions. 
 
Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005) provide a good, concise review of the primary economic 
explanations of the proposed resource curse. Bulte et al. deconstruct the explanations into three 
categories- Dutch disease models, rent seeking models, and institutional explanations. The Dutch 
disease explanations focus on the neglect of manufacturing and other economic activities 
conducive to long-run growth in favor of short term-resource exports afforded by resource 
abundance. This line of research is not the principal concern of this paper, but it is worth noting 
that the Dutch disease explanation does not lend itself to very much empirical examination, and 
so it has not been able to explain very much to date. 
 
Rent-seeking explanations assume that the extraction and export of natural resource wealth is 
essentially a rent-seeking exercise enjoyed exclusively by governments. This exercise leads to 
misallocation of time and labor toward a place in the rent-seeking group and away from 
productive activities. Included in these non-productive economic activities is corruption in 
government. Bulte et al., however, point out that “resources are a curse to development only for 
some countries and not for others, however, so the basic rent-seeking explanation is too blunt.” 
The rent-seeking model is closely related to the approach of this paper, but there is an important 
distinction.  
 
Generally speaking, both the rent-seeking and Dutch disease explanations of the natural resource 
curse rely on a distortion of the incentives that encourage the kinds of economic activity that 
persists and grows in the long run. The last explanation- the one that most heavily motivates this 
paper- is not directly economic. This set of explanations, dubbed the ‘institutional approach,’ 
argues that resource abundance causes economic decline not through a misallocation of time, 
labor and/or capital, but through a deterioration of governing institutions. Negative changes in 
quality of government institutions, in turn, produce poor economic outcomes.2  
 
According the Bulte et al., the main feature of these institutional arguments, to date, is that levels 
of democracy tend to be negatively affected by the abundance of natural resources, particularly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#!This reasoning implicitly accepts widespread findings that institutional and governmental organization 
and quality is an important variable affecting growth outcomes for economies. This is an intuitive point, 
but also one that is often supported by evidence. See, for example, Knack and Keefer (1995). !
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by point-source resources. (Point-source resources are those which can be accessed and extracted 
at precise, discrete locations, like gold or coal, rather than dispersed over large accessible areas, 
like soil or water.) By extension, the explanation also requires that higher levels of democracy 
lead to better economic outcomes.3  
 
 
 
Bulte et al. summarize their review of the resource curse literature as follows:  
 
The overall picture that emerges is that the direct effect of resource wealth on 
economic growth disappears whenever institutional quality is controlled for, 
however, an important indirect effect exists. Certain types of resource wealth 
negatively affect the quality of institutions, and institutional quality in turn is an 
important determinant of economic growth. 
 
In other words, there are direct resource effects on economic outcomes, but high levels of 
democracy and strong institutions often protect economies from these effects. Institutions 
themselves, however, may be vulnerable to resource effects, and may pass this vulnerability on 
to the greater economy. At the same time, research on this specific piece of the relationship is far 
from mature. 
 
 A.3. Natural Resource Dependency: A Curse for Institutions? 
 
The contemporary literature suggests that the institutional pathway is among the most useful and 
most interesting explanations for the apparent negative impact of resource wealth on economies. 
There are many ways that one might conceive of resource wealth degrading the quality of 
governing institutions, if indeed it does so. For example, is it that resources are difficult to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$!This is another somewhat intuitive point, but has only mixed support in the literature. According to 
Barro (1996), Helliwell (1994) and several others, democracy tends to improve growth outcomes at low 
levels of economic and political and development but actually presents obstacles at later stages of 
development. This relationship makes when sense when considering that highly developed, democratic 
nations often have populations that prefer redistributive policies such as universal healthcare and 
progressive income taxes.!
Considering Democracy 
A notable point is that the ‘level of democracy’ is an expansive term. It may include a 
number of interesting, more precise sub-concepts, any of which may have a more intuitive 
direct relationship to natural resource endowments. Further, democracy may be related to 
even more interesting and diverse indicators of good governance, again with potentially 
more insight-rich relationships to natural resources. In general, most studies in this 
specific area focus on the impact of resources on either democracy or corruption, but 
some recent papers have forayed furthering into more precise and remote areas. One could 
argue that such forays are also more interesting and relevant to resource curse scholars, 
because democracy is merely a form of government, and does not necessarily speak to the 
effectiveness of institutions or experiences of populations. I shall return to the question of 
how to consider democracy levels later on. !
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manage, and so governments become divided and disenfranchised? Do people interact less 
frequently with their governing institutions in resource rich countries? Or is it that resource 
wealthy regions are, historically, more likely to be subject to invasion and subjugation, putting 
modern governments at a disadvantage? If resources do in fact degrade institutions and quality of 
government, we do not yet know how and along what dimensions. Consideration of the NCS 
critique of national accounts along with these questions has led me to the following question:  
 
Can we use the NCS critique to explore whether or not natural resources present a curse 
to governance and institutions, rather than to economic output? 
 
In other words, is it possible to learn something by examining the impact of natural capital stock 
depletion on the quality of government and institutions, rather than that of natural resource 
availability on economic growth? The hypothesis of this paper can be encapsulated as follows: 
 
Increases in dependency on oil stock depletion, measured by percentage of oil rents to 
GDP, lead to declines in the quality of government, represented by measurements of 
rule of law, corruption, judicial impartiality, and more.  
 
If this hypothesis is borne out, it will constitute a meaningful insight into the role of institutions 
in the resource curse debate, which at the current time is only weakly understood as little more 
than an influential exogenous factor. 
 
 
B. Literature Review 
 
As noted in the previous section, the resource curse literature is vast, diverse, and in many ways 
incomplete. Bulte, Damania and Deacon (2005) provide a useful and succint review of the 
primary economic explanations of the resource curse, a relationship first formally postulated by 
Sachs and Warner in a series of papers in the 1990s. This paper adopts the characterization of the 
literature offered by Bulte et al., according to which the institutional explanation is just one of 
three major attempts in the literature to explain the apparent negative relationship- in some 
countries- between natural resource wealth and economic outcomes. The institutional branch of 
explanations, as I will demonstrate in the following section, is far from being fully explored. It 
has to date focused heavily on democracy and corruption effects while neglecting other 
institutional factors that may influence growth outcomes. It is important and interesting, 
however, to consider the work that has been done, tracing the investigation from broad 
postulations about governance effects to detailed statistical examinations of specific indicators, 
including one particular recent paper that has very similar objectives as this one. 
 
B.1. Origins of the Institutional Explanation  
 
The institutional explanation emerged with the works of Karl (1997), Auty (2001), and Leite and 
Weidmann (2002), in some cases as an incidental finding or suggestion for further research. It is 
an intuitive and acknowledged fact that in some ways economic and political development go 
hand in hand, and that determining the direction of causality between the two is often a difficult 
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and confusing endeavor.4 Terry Lynn Karl was one of the first scholars to consider the natural 
resource curse thoroughly in the light of this insight. Her 1997 book “The Paradox of Plenty: Oil 
Booms and Petro States” is an attempt to answer the question,   
 
“After benefitting from the largest transfer of wealth ever to occur without war, why have most 
oil-exporting countries suffered from economic deterioration and political decay?”  (p. xv.) 
 
Her conclusion, derived from thorough analysis of several case studies, is one that reflects the 
complex causal mechanisms between political and economic change, (p. 6).  
 
The fate of oil-exporting economies must be understood in a context in which 
economies shape institutions and, in turn, are shaped by them. Specific modes of 
economic development, adapted in a concrete institutional setting, gradually 
transform political and social institutions in a manner that subsequently encourages 
or discourages productive outcomes. Because the causal arrow between economic 
development and institutional change constantly runs in both directions, the 
accumulated outcomes give form to divergent long-run national trajectories. 
 
These assertions are theoretically applicable to all nations regardless of resource endowments. 
The point, supported by a large of amount of economic development theory, is that economic 
and political changes are not wholly separable from one another. It is not difficult to see why the 
connectedness between these spheres is more apparent in nations wherein significant benefits of 
economic development accrue to the government, such as is often the case in resource rich 
countries. Karl goes on to discuss several processes in resource-rich nations as potential sources 
of government degradation and reformulation of the role of government itself, (p. 7).  
 
Commodity-led growth induces changes in prevailing notions of property rights, 
the relative power of interest groups and organizations, and the role and characters 
of the state vis-à-vis markets. These institutional changes subsequently define the 
revenue basis of the state, especially its tax structure. How these states collect and 
distribute taxes, in turn, creates incentives that pervasively influence the 
organization of political and economic life and shapes government preferences with 
respect to public policies. 
 
Karl’s main contribution was the application of the acknowledged, complex relationship between 
political and economic change to the resource curse debate; resource abundance itself changes 
the nature of certain political relationships, most importantly the relationships between states and 
markets, and between the tax base and the government. 
 
Auty (2001) affirms some of Karl’s assertion when he writes, “The political state in most 
resource-abundant economies tends to be a factional oligarchy or predatory state that deploys the 
resource rents (typically 13–23% of GDP) to promote sectional interests at the expense of a 
coherent economic policy and long-run social welfare,” (p. 844). Auty does not explain how the 
governments of these nations became factional, predatory or sectionally biased, focusing instead !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%!See, for example Gradstein, (2004).!
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on pathways out of resource traps for national economies. Nonetheless this is a strong statement 
on the importance of governance as a mediator between natural resources and both economic and 
social outcomes. 
  
Leite and Weidmann (2002) expand on Karl’s proposed mechanisms of institutional change in a 
precise manner, focusing on one particular distortion: the relationship between resource-
intensive growth and levels of corruption. The authors posit that corruption is the key 
instrumental mediator between resource abundance and poor economic growth, as it is likely to 
erode the functioning of institutions across the board. While this may seem to some a slightly 
narrow suggestion, the paper is extremely important and useful; it is one of the first empirical 
investigations of the relationship between natural resources and government quality or 
effectiveness. The paper contains several noteworthy findings. First, capital-intensive natural 
resources were found to be “a major determinant of corruption.” Secondly, negative growth 
effects of corruption are affirmed, meaning that natural resources reduce growth indirectly 
through increased corruption. Finally, the authors make the following claim. 
 
Both our theoretical and empirical results stress the importance of strong (or at least 
strengthened) institutions in the wake of natural resource discoveries as a way to 
curb associated negative growth effects of corruption. This is especially true in less 
developed countries where natural resource discoveries have a much higher relative 
impact on both the capital stock and the extent of corruption, and are confronted 
with generally weaker and less adaptable institutions. 
 
This is a good example of the many interesting suggestions and explanations that arose as the 
institutional explanation emerged. Although Leite and Weidmann focused exclusively on 
corruption, it is easy to see how this research my have led to further enquiries into more diverse 
measures of institutional and government quality. This is also one of the first attempts to discuss 
the extent to which strong institutions may be more resistant to resource curse effects than 
weaker ones. This is a suggestion I test in this study. 
 
A conceptually similar study was undertaken by Ross (2001), who sought to test the proposed 
negative relationship of resource wealth on levels of democracy, focusing largely on oil. Ross, 
through econometric analysis of a global panel dataset, found significant support for the 
hypothesis. He concludes, “The oil-impedes-democracy claim is both valid and statistically 
robust; in other words, oil does hurt democracy…Second, the harmful influence of oil is not 
restricted to the Middle East…The third finding is that nonfuel mineral wealth also impedes 
democratization.” These are important conclusions that serve to greatly expand the horizons of 
the natural resource curse debate both geographically and conceptually. 
 
Another early example of empirical testing of the emerging institutional explanations is Mehlum 
et al., (2002). The approach in this paper was to carry out an institution-specific analysis of 
resource curse outcomes, regarding institutional settings as predetermined and fixed for the 
duration of study. This was an interesting step with useful results. Essentially the authors sought 
to reassert arguments dismissed by Sachs and Warner in the 1990’s by showing that countries 
with high quality institutions did not suffer (or suffered less) from the resource curse. The results 
strongly supported this claim, showing that nations with better institutions coped with resource 
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wealth better in terms of economic growth. This paper did well to affirm the importance of 
institutions in the resource curse debate, and showed that institutional quality can instrumental be 
in determining economic outcomes.  
 
There are, however, some shortcomings. By fixing institutional quality exogenously over the 
duration of study, Mehlum et al. implicitly assume that resource type or extraction magnitude 
has no impact on quality of government. While this paper played a role in the emergence of the 
institutional literature, showing that institutional quality affects eventual outcomes of resource 
wealth, it seems to have overlooked the possibility that the nature and extraction of the resources 
themselves may influence the very institutions in question. 
 
There is at least one remaining work that is extremely relevant to this investigation of the 
resource curse, despite the fact that, like Mehlum et al., it does not address the causal mechanism 
on which the present paper focuses. Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) claim that non-sustainable 
management might be the key problem to the resource curse debate. They test the suggestion that 
the countries suffering poor economic outcomes in the face of resource abundance are exactly 
those that manage resources unsustainably, as reflected by a low rate of genuine savings. The 
argument can be thought of as a version of the Solow exogenous growth model that adjusts the 
savings rate to consider natural capital depreciation. The findings are significant, and they also 
shed some light on some of the earlier studies I have mentioned. 
 
Regarding the wider relationship between the resource curse, savings and growth, 
we find that those resource abundant countries that have suffered from a curse 
appear to be those countries that have low or negative genuine savings. The savings 
and investment response that might be expected to arise in the presence of resource 
abundance will also depend on a number of factors including the quality of 
institutions that have a bearing on the efficiency of investments and risk to 
economic resources invested for the future. In this respect, we have found that there 
is some evidence to suggest that resource abundant countries with good quality 
institutions have enjoyed greater rates of investment and, to a lesser extent, 
saving…These results, we argue, offer another perspective on the resource curse 
hypothesis: countries where growth has lagged behind the average are those where 
the combination of natural resource, macroeconomic and public expenditure 
policies has led to a low rate of (genuine) saving. (p. 1804) 
 
The authors note the subtle proposition that countries with better institutions tend to manage their 
resources more sustainably and achieve higher genuine savings. This is an important point and is 
directly related to both the key question of the present paper and the NCS critique of national 
account discussed earlier. Again, the distinction is that the causal arrow points in the opposite 
direction to the hypothesis that I propose, which is that increases in resource extraction (lower 
genuine savings) leads to decreases in quality of institutions.  
 
B.2. Shortcomings and Extensions of the Institutional Explanation 
 
The papers discussed so far have posed and answered a number of interesting questions 
concerning the role of an institutional mediator in the natural resource curse relationship. 
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Generally the picture that emerges is that quality of institutions has a lot to do with whether or 
not resource wealth translates into poor economic outcomes, particularly in terms of corruption 
and even sustainable resource management. However, these papers tend to focus exclusively on 
one side of a potential two-way relationship; they ignore the idea that resource dependency itself 
might degrades institutions, thus making a cursed outcome more likely in the long term. At least 
one paper that does explore this suggestion is currently under publication. 
 
This study is, in a sense, an application and extension of the specific ideas presented first (to the 
best of my knowledge) by Mette Anthonsen, Åsa Löfgren and Klas Nilsson of the University of 
Gothenburg’s Quality of Government Institute in a 2009 working paper entitled “Rent Seeking: 
Bad for Quality of Governance.” Anthonsen et al. correctly note that there is no shortage of 
studies tracing, in line with the common trajectory of resource curse enquires, the effect of 
natural resource abundance on democracy. The authors depart from this approach, and other 
common approach in the institutional resource curse literature, in the following two ways.  
 
First, we theorize how oil and gas rents influence quality of government rather than 
regime type. Second, we test our model with a measure of resource wealth based on 
rent dependency rather than income: It is money made by the state on oil and gas 
resources relative to other state income that influences quality of government, not 
the existence of natural resources per se or a certain amount of production per 
capita. 
 
Anthonsen et al., in contrast to a number of other recent authors, consider governance or 
institutional quality to be a critical dependent variable and seek to examine whether or not it is 
determined in part by natural resource rent dependency. Institutional quality is considered not a 
fixed intermediary between natural resource endowments and economic outcomes, but a 
dynamic factor that may have more subtle implications. I share this approach.  
 
The authors test the effect of oil and gas rent dependency on three dimensions of government 
quality: control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and rule of law. The dataset covers 139 
nations from 1984 to 2006. The findings are that significant negative effects of gas and oil 
dependency exist for all three dimensions, and that negative impacts exist for bureaucratic 
quality and rule of law even when controlling for corruption levels. These results are an 
important, econometric demonstration that heavy natural resource extraction can lead to the 
corrosion of not only economic growth and levels of democracy, but also of a range of other 
dimensions of government effectiveness.  
 
The implications of this study, as well as the use of a measure of economic resource dependency 
rather than production, are significant motivations for the completion of the investigation 
presented here. It is my goal to extend the approach and methodology of this paper to a broader 
range of government quality indicators with a focus on oil-producing nations in particular. 
 
B.3. Why Study Oil Rents? 
 
There are a number of economic, political and environmental reasons to be interested in oil rents 
in particular. Unlike other forms of economic rent, natural resource rent- and oil rent especially- 
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is not labor intensive, and so involves only a small number of the population in employment. 
And so, as Anthonsen et al. note, the principal benefits to accrue to the general population from 
oil extraction come from consumption and from welfare concessions from the government. For 
most of the nations considered in this study exports constitute a huge proportion of production, 
and so the benefits from consumption are not large and the relative importance of welfare grows. 
 
In fact the extent of dependency on oil incomes is, in many nations, astronomical. There is no 
other resource that has provided such a significant proportion of national income over the last 
several decades for so many nations. This is important because this paper proposes that it is 
relative size of natural capital stock depletion (oil extraction) in an economy, rather than 
absolute size, that matters. See Figure 1 below for an illustration of dependency across nations 
and time. 
 
A related consideration is that, as we know from the experience of nations like Saudi Arabia, the 
prospect of wealth accruing directly to governments from oil production is very high- perhaps 
higher than other economic rents. Intuitively one may be able to attribute this characteristic to the 
nature of oil reserves- often spread beneath both public and private lands, or perhaps offshore, 
and generally inaccessible without government involvement or management. It is also important 
to note that the availability of data on oil production, prices, production costs and reserves 
surpasses that of most of other nonrenewable natural resources. The varied political and 
economic experiences of major oil production nations is also appealing- consider, for example, 
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the disparities between Norway, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and Nigeria. These facts serve to make 
this study both more feasible and more interesting. 
 
 
C. Indicators of Quality of Government 
 
C.1. Defining Quality of Government  
 
The goal of this study is to examine a range of areas in which national economic dependence on 
oil rents may have meaningful consequences for governance. This is motivated in part by the 
desire to question how institutional degradation may ultimately influence growth outcomes in 
resource-rich countries. But, as Anthonsen et al. point out, it is important to keep in mind that 
quality of governing institutions is an important variable in its own right. It is worthwhile to 
examine the effects of resource dependency on institutions in search of both economic and 
sociopolitical insight. 
 
The literature to date has focused mainly on indicators that reflect governmental organization 
and neutrality (namely, democracy and corruption). In light of the motivations and goals of this 
paper, I think it is useful to extend the analysis to a range of fields that includes both the 
outcomes ultimately experienced by citizens, and more specific measures of governmental 
organization. Corresponding to this framework, the indicators I have chosen to analyze can be 
split into the following two categories, which are summarized in sections C.2 and C.3.  
 
1) Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms 
2) Governmental Processes and Arrangements 
 
C.2. Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms 
 
This group of variables can be though of as a measure of quality of government if one considers 
the experiences of citizens vis-à-vis political figures and institutions as one outcome of 
governance and institutional functionality. 
 
Freedom of Speech 
This data is derived from the CIRI Humans Rights Data Project and is made available in the 
University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Governance Institute (QOG). The indicator measures 
government censorship of the media according to the following scale: 
(0) Complete 
(1) Some 
(2) None 
 
Freedom of Association 
This variable, also derived from the CIRI dataset, measures the extent of citizen freedoms of 
assembly and association according to the following scale: 
(0)  Severely restricted or denied completely to all citizens 
(1)  Limited for all citizens or severely restricted or denied for selected groups 
(2)  Virtually unrestricted and freely enjoyed by practically all citizens 
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Business Freedoms 
This variable is derived from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, and is also 
included in the QOG data. It measures the bureaucratic and economic ease of starting and 
maintaining a business, and includes a weighted average of ten components scaled to a score 
between 0 and 100, where 100 represents maximum business freedoms. 
 
Political Terror Scale 
This variable is an unweighted average of two measures, one published by the United States 
State Department and the other by Amnesty International, both available at 
www.politicalterrorscale.org and through the QOG dataset. Both use a 1 to 5 scale to measure 
the extent to which private citizens are subject to manipulation, persecution, torture, 
imprisonment and other acts of terror due to political ideology or allegiance. A score of 1 
represents little or no pressure exerted on citizens by government institutions while a score of 5 
represents extremely frequent and widespread use of political terror. The two component 
indicators are often identical but in some cases do diverge, and so an unweighted average is used 
in this study. 
 
Law and Order 
This variable comes from the International Country Risk Guide, made available in the Political 
Constraints Index Dataset by Professor Witold Henisz of the University of Pennsylvania. The 
indicator scores Law and Order separately, each on a scale of 1 to 3, resulting in a summed score 
between 1 and 6 with higher scores representing higher levels of law and order. 
 
Property Rights 
This data is also taken from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom via the QOG 
Institute. It reflects both the extent to which the government protects private property rights by 
law and the enforcement of these laws. Scores range from 0 to 100, with 100 representing a 
maximum level of protection of property rights. 
 
C.3. Governmental Processes and Arrangements 
 
This group of variables considers both electoral and governmental organization and processes. A 
number of the variables included in this group fit in with the conceptualization of good 
governance as impartiality with regard to citizens and their various interests, as found in the 
literature. Some variables also speak to limits to, or abuses of, power. 
 
Independence of the Judiciary 
This indicator is also derived from Henisz’s Political Constraints Dataset. It is a binary variable, 
set equal to 1 if a country has an independent judiciary according to minimum scores on other 
indicators of government arrangements, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Executive Constraints 
This variable is published in the Polity IV Project dataset, a widely used source of international 
governance data in political sciences, again included in the QOG dataset. According to the 
authors, the variable “refers to the extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making 
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powers of the chief executive, whether an individual or a collective executive… The degree of 
checks and balances between the various parts of the government is coded on a 7-point scale 
which ranges from unlimited executive authority (1) to executive parity or subordination (7).” 
 
Absence of Corruption: This variable comes from the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic 
Freedoms, once again, and actually measures levels of perceived corruption. Lower scores 
correspond to higher levels of corruption, with the scale running from 1 to 100. 
 
Contestation of Governance, Inclusiveness of Governance 
These data are made available through the Quality Of Governance Institute and attributable to 
Michael Coppedge and his colleagues Alvarez and Maldonado. The QOG Institute defines the 
two variables in the following way. 
 
There is contestation when citizens have unimpaired opportunities to…formulate 
their preferences, signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the 
government by individual and collective action, [and] have their preferences 
weighed equally in the conduct of the government…Inclusiveness is variation in 
the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane 
in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government. 
 
Both variables are created by principal component analysis, a transformation designed to make 
unwieldy data as useful as possible. 
 
Quality of Government 
This variable is also published by the International Country Risk Guide, and made available by 
the QOG Institute. It is calculated as the mean value of the same dataset’s measures of 
Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality. Values range continuously from 0 to 1, 
with higher values indicating higher quality of government. 
 
 
D. Methodology 
 
The approach that lends itself to this inquiry is a set of fairly uncomplicated panel regressions 
that seek to expose the impact of a measure of oil dependency on the chosen indicators of 
governance quality, controlling for other important factors. The panel dataset I have assembled 
through aggregation of existing data and calculation of oil dependency covers sixteen countries 
from 1987 to 2008, and includes all indicators discussed above, with varying numbers of missing 
observations, as well as thorough data for the control variables discussed below. 
 
D.1. Control Variables 
 
Income  
This is a hugely important factor for which to control. There is a huge disparity in levels of per 
capita income between the sixteen countries involved in this study. Numerous studies confirm 
the intuitive, positive relationship between persistent, high levels of income per capita high 
levels of government quality. Not to control for this relationship would be a serious omission. 
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For the sake of consistency, I have calculated GDP per capita in 2008 US dollars for all country-
years. The original data for this calculation is taken from the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009. The calculation was performed by translating 
2008 GDP levels into US dollars using that year’s exchange rates, and using the IMF’s economic 
growth rates data to trace each nation’s GDP back to 1987 in the same terms. These figures were 
then transformed into per capita terms using population numbers obtained from the same source. 
 
Middle East   
There are reasons both for and against the inclusion of geography as a control variable. Nations 
in the Middle East are, as a rule, notoriously unstable and are not known for high government 
quality. In all likelihood this is due in some part to the well-established importance of oil 
incomes to the national economies of the region. However, it is important to distinguish between 
entrenched low levels of government quality determined long ago, and short-term effects of 
changes in oil dependency on governance indicators. As the former is commonly thought to be 
widespread in this particular region, I have chosen to include a dummy variable that is set equal 
to one for countries in the Middle East. This is directly in line with the approach taken by 
Anthonsen et al. 
 
Oil Price 
Controlling for oil prices is an important consideration in this study. Figure 2 below shows the 
relationship between annual changes in oil prices and oil rents. In measuring the dependency of 
national economies on oil rents, we must ask whether a one-year spike in oil prices, and a 
corresponding increase in oil rents for all nations in that year, truly represents an increased 
dependency on oil rents. In the context of this study, which aims to expose some effects of 
natural resource dependence, it is more important to capture changes in oil extraction levels than 
oil price effects. 
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The intuition behind this assertion is that although higher oil prices do lead directly to higher oil 
dependency in numeric terms, the amount of money brought in by the oil sector is not the only 
measure of it’s primacy in an economy. Many of the effects I aim to investigate could very well 
be propagated through a wide range of impacts of a disproportionately large oil sector, whether 
or not the sector’s profits spike in a given year. Such considerations include a skewed labor 
market, high prevalence and predominance of foreign commercial interests, and self-promoting, 
non-public interest based governance regimes. These proposed pathways to poor governance are 
more a function of the historic and expected future dependency on oil rents than of temporary 
price changes. 
 
The data I use to control for oil prices is an unweighted average, in each year, of the average 
prices of the three primary oil spot prices- Dubai Fateh, Brent and West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI). The original price data themselves were obtained from two sources. The Dubai Fateh 
price data was obtained in monthly form from IndexMundi and then converted to simple annual 
averages. The Brent and WTI average annual spot price data is obtained directly from the US 
Energy Information Administration.  
 
Democracy Level 
I have chosen to run two regressions for each indicator, one of which will include a control 
variable that represents the level of democracy. This is an important part of the methodology. 
One reason for this approach is that democracy levels may be considered either an input to or an 
output of government, or both. In other words, some may consider a high level of democracy a 
mere indicator of good governance, while others consider it an actual part of the definition of 
good governance. It is not this author’s place to decide how precisely to characterize democracy, 
and so conclusions will be drawn from careful consideration of both regressions, cognizant of the 
different implications of the models.  
 
Further, and perhaps more importantly for the resource curse debate, comparison of results from 
the two regressions will illustrate the extent to which any institutional resource curse effects 
diminish when controlling for high preexisting institutional quality. This follows the literature of 
the economic resource curse which, as discussed earlier, tends to find that resource curse effects 
vanish almost completely when controlling for institutional quality. It will be interesting to test 
whether or not the same can be said of any institutional resource effects that are found. 
 
The variable used to measure the level of democracy in a country-year is the same as used by 
Lofgren et al. It is constructed by taking the average of Freedom House measures of Civil 
Liberties and Political Rights, as well the overall score from the Polity IV dataset. Observations 
fall between 0 (complete autocracy) and 10 (perfect democracy).  The data is made available by 
Teorell et al., (2009) in the updated Quality of Government Dataset. 
 
 D.2. Regression Models 
 
A typical panel regression, including control variables, would have the following form, 
 
Governance Indicatori,t = ! i  + "1(Dependencyi,t) + "2(Incomei,t) + "3(Oil Pricet)  
+ "4(Mideasti) + ei,t,      (Eq. 1) 
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where i =1…16 denotes the country and t =1…22 denotes the year, ! represents a constant, "1 
through "4  represent the weights of the explanatory variables, and e is the usual error term. (Oil 
Price does not vary across countries, because I am using a global oil price, and Mideast does not 
vary for each country, because geographical location does not vary over time.)  
 
Such a regression will be run for each of the individual indicators for which I hypothesize a 
relationship with the oil dependency ratio. Many of the indicators are highly autocorrelated, and 
for reasons to be discussed shortly the method I have chosen to deal with this problem is to 
include a lagged version of the dependent variable as an independent variable. Thus, for 
autocorrelated indicators, the equation takes the following form: 
 
Governance Indicatori,t = ! i  + "1(Dependencyi,t) + "2(Governance Indicatori,t-3) 
+ "3(Incomei,t) + "4(Oil Pricet) + "5(Mideasti) + ei,t 
 
(Eq. 1.1) 
 
As discussed earlier, regressions will be run for each indicator both with and without a control 
variable for the level of democracy in a given country-year. The second set of equations is just 
the same as Equation 1 and Equation 1.1 (depending on the presence of autocorrelation for the 
indicator in question) except with one more independent variable. 
 
 
Governance Indicatori,t = ! i  + "1(Dependencyi,t) + "2(Incomei,t) + "3(Oil Pricet)  
+ "4(Mideasti) + "5(Democracyi,t) + ei,t 
(Eq. 2) 
 
 
Governance Indicatori,t = ! i  + "1(Dependencyi,t) + "2(Governance Indicatori,t-3) 
+ "3(Incomei,t) + "4(Oil Pricet) + "5(Mideasti) + "6(Democracyi,t) + ei,t 
 
(Eq. 2.1) 
 
D.3. Quantifying Oil Dependency 
 
A crucial step in the execution of these models is the creation of a set of data describing adjusted 
levels of GDP for oil producing nations over time. Following the approach of Anthonsen et al., I 
have chosen to employ a simple ratio of oil rents to GDP as a measure of economic dependence 
on oil extraction. This measure, for the sake of consistency, will also use 2008 US dollars as a 
price base. The GDP data for this ratio are those calculated from the IMF’s WEO, as discussed 
above, without being adjusted to per capita terms. Oil rent figures are then divided by GDP 
figures to give a ratio of oil rents to total economic activity in a given country-year. Oil rents are 
defined in the following equation. 
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Annual Oil Rents = (Production in Barrels) x {(Market Price in $/Barrel) –  
(Production Costs in $/Barrel)} 
(Eq. 3) 
 
Oil production data used for this calculation is obtained from the US EIA at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilproduction.html. The price data used is the same 
unweighted average discussed above.  
 
Once the somewhat complex calculation of oil rents is complete for each country-year, it is an 
easy step to divide the figures by GDP to obtain the Oil Rent : GDP dependency ratio. Another 
interesting use of the data, highly relevant to the motivating concepts of this paper, is to instead 
subtract oil rents from GDP. Recall from earlier section the discussion of the Natural Capital 
Stock critique of national accounts, and attempts in the literature to adjust GDP according to 
NCS depletion. This calculation is precisely that- national accounts adjusted for oil stock 
depletion. Figure 3 below illustrates a few examples of the differences between reported GDP 
and the adjusted figures found via these calculations. As discussed in the introductory section, 
these comparisons are often interesting. I include them in order to note the fact that noticeable 
differences exist, and that it would be interesting to explore the implications of these differences. 
A Note on Production Costs 
An important step in the calculation of oil rents is the subtraction of production costs from 
oil incomes. The payments to labor and capital from production are distinct from those of 
simple resource extraction, and are considered true economic productivity rather than rent of 
any kind. It makes sense to exclude this economic activity from the study and consider only 
the “in-ground value” of oil when calculating rents. There is no comprehensive data showing 
average productions costs for oil across any meaningful range of countries for the years 
considered in this paper. In order to approximate production costs, I have relied upon data 
collected by the US Energy Information Administration’s Financial Reporting System (Form 
EIA-28, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/frs/frstables.cfm#).  
 
The companies that provide the responses to this survey (hereon, FRS Companies) are oil 
companies based in the United States, many of which operate all over the world. (Many of 
the oil companies at work in any given nation are of US or European origins, for obvious 
reasons.) The FRS Companies report their respective total production costs and production 
volume, which are reported by the EIA in an aggregated, regional form. From this data I was 
able to calculate production costs specific to each production region in each year from 1987 
to 2008. The regions are the following- United States; Canada; Europe; Former Soviet 
Union; Africa; Middle East; Other Eastern Hemisphere; Other Western Hemisphere. 
 
The production costs I use for each country-year, then, are the per-barrel costs reported by 
FRS Companies in that region in that year. This means that Mexico and Venezuela have the 
same estimated average production costs in all years, as do Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. There are clear shortcomings to this approach- it is unlikely the production 
costs for the countries within these groups are completely identical. However, due to the 
nature of oil reserves this is certainly a useful approximation, and it is preferable by far to 
the alternative of not subtracting production costs at all. !
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Table 2 shows oil rent figures for each of the relevant countries from 1987 to 2008, while Table 
3 shows the ratio of oil rents to GDP. The tables can be found in the Appendix on pages 35 and 
36. 
 
D.4. OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
 
Panel datasets are unique in that they have both time-series and cross sectional components. In 
this case, for example, one could consider the dataset to be 22 different cross-sections of 
government indicators and oil rents for 16 countries, with each cross-section separated by one 
year. Or one could consider the dataset to be one 22-year time-series, repeated for 16 different 
countries. 
 
Recall the general form of regressions in this study as stated in Equation 2.1: 
  
Governance Indicatori,t = ! i  + "1(Dependencyi,t) + "2(Governance Indicatori,t-3) 
+ "3(Incomei,t) + "4(Oil Pricet) + "5(Mideasti) + "6(Democracyi,t) + ei,t 
 
Given this form, there are several ways to use regression analysis to estimate relationships in 
panel data depending on our assumptions about the data. In constant coefficients models, it is 
assumed there is variation in neither the constant nor the slopes across neither nations nor years. 
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For our purposes these assumptions are not appropriate (as we can anticipate meaningful 
variation across time and space). Another option is to assume that while the constant term ! does 
not vary either between countries or across years, the coefficients associated with each 
independent variable differ either over time or location. This is known as a fixed effects model, 
because the role of the constant (and by extension, the role of the error term ei,t) is fixed. 
The third option is known as random effects estimation. In this approach, the effects of the 
constant term and, by extension, that of the error term are both variable either across i, t, or even 
across both. This is known as random effects estimation because the constant term is thought to 
be randomly determined, while in the fixed effects model there is thought to be some structure, 
either geographic or temporal, to the constant term. 
 
In this study it makes sense, at least initially, to consider whether to employ fixed or random 
effects modeling for each of the dependent variables being analyzed. Because the countries being 
modeled are so diverse in terms of geography and political and economic history, intuition may 
suggest that a random effects model will be appropriate more often than not. However, there may 
be factors that influence all countries in a similar way in the determination of certain variables in 
the data. For example, while levels of political participation may be best suited to a random 
effects model, it may be that levels of freedom of speech actually have something in common 
across the 16 countries in the study, due to the common influence of international media or other 
global forces. And so it is reasonable to suggest that neither approach is perfectly appropriate at 
all times. 
 
In order to find a methodology that is consistently appropriate for these models, it is important to 
consider the three basic conditions relating to error terms that need to be satisfied for panel 
regressions. They are as follows: 
 
(1) No groupwise heteroskedasticity 
(2) No serial correlation of error terms 
(3) No contemporaneous correlation of error terms 
 
Groupwise heteroskedasticity exists when error terms have constant variances within a cross-
section panel data, but vary across subjects. Serial correlation occurs when error terms are 
autocorrelated within one cross-section. Contemporaneous correlation occurs when error terms 
across subjects in one time period are correlated. All three of these problems are a concern with 
at least some subset of the regressions that I am running. In some cases, all three issues may be 
present in the same regression. 
 
In order to deal with each of these problems simultaneously it is useful to consider studies 
performed in political science with datasets of similar dimensions. Panel datasets wherein the 
number of panels, N, is roughly equal to the number of time periods, T, are sometimes referred 
to as Times-Series Cross-Sectional (TSCS) datasets. The name is not significant; what matters is 
that such datasets are econometrically distinct from panel datasets with many panels and 
relatively few time periods, as is the case for most economic panel data. The kinds of data have 
different properties with regard to analysis and, more generally, tend to address different issues. 
Specifically, TSCS data are more often concerned with political studies of different geographical 
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units. The dataset used in this study has those very concerns, has N=16 and T=22, and so could 
be considered TSCS data. 
 
There are two regression techniques widely recommended in the literature for datasets of this 
nature. After review of this literature I have chosen to employ an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE), first made popular by Beck and Katz 
(1995). Recall the three fundamental conditions required for panel data regressions discussed 
earlier. This method immediately deals with issues (1) and (3), by design. A simple 
autocorrelation correction method, discussed below, deals with assumption (2). The alternative to 
PCSE known as Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), but based on reviewing the 
literature it seems that PCSE it more appropriate than FGLS for this data, and is likely to yield 
better estimators. The following excerpt from Frees’ widely used text on panel data analysis in 
the social sciences concisely explains the benefits of OLS with PCSE. 
 
Cross-sectional correlations are particularly important in studies of governmental 
units, such as states or nations…Such studies involves economic, social or political 
comparisons of countries or states; because of the linkages among governmental 
units, the interest is in models that permit substantial contemporaneous 
correlation…To account for the cross-sectional correlations, [Beck and Katz 
(1995)] recommend using standards errors that are robust to the presence of cross-
sectional correlations that they call panel-corrected standard errors…They provide 
simulation studies that establish that the robust t-statistics resulting from the use of 
panel-corrected standard errors are preferable to the ordinary t-statistics, using 
either OLS or feasible GLS…Using simulation, they demonstrate that this 
procedure is superior to the feasible GLS estimator using the Parks model. 
 
The principal danger of using this refined Ordinary Least Squares regression is violation of the 
zero conditional mean assumption. What this assumption means is that for OLS to produce 
unbiased estimators, there must be no significant un-modeled unit heterogeneity. In other words, 
there must be no significant differences between countries that are not thoroughly and properly 
accounted for in the specification of the model. When such differences do exist, the zero 
conditional mean assumption is violated, resulting in a particular variety of omitted variable bias, 
perhaps most common problem in regression analysis. Wilson and Butler (2004) state the 
problem concisely and accurately. 
 
Unit heterogeneity means that countries differ in ways not explained by observed 
independent variables. In other words, potentially important local factors are 
unobservable to the researcher, which results in omitted variable bias. Standard 
OLS regression does not offer a solution to omitted variable bias, and PCSEs are 
also not a solution. 
 
Wilson and Butler go on to explain that rather than relying on PCSE analysis to solve problems 
of unobserved differences, researchers should strive to specify models properly and model these 
differences, and Beck (2007) agrees. The important conclusion from these papers is that OLS 
with PCSEs, much like any regression technique, is only reliable and effective when researchers 
are careful to specify models precisely. There are a number of ways to examine whether or not a 
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model is adequately well-specified to use PCSEs. As I explain in more detail in my Results and 
Discussion sections, I am confident that use of PCSEs is appropriate in this case because the R-
Squared statistics for my regressions are consistently very high, often surpassing .8 and .9. One 
interpretation of these statistics is that almost all the variation in the dependent variables are 
explained by variations in the independent variables, which is equivalent to saying that the 
models are well-specified. 
 
 
 
E. Results 
 
Pages 38 through 41 in the Appendix contain Tables 4 and 5, each in two parts. Table 4 reports 
regression results for the first category of governance indicators, Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms. 
Table 5 reports results for the second category, Government Processes and Arrangements. 
Section E.1 and E.2 describe the results of the regression in these two categories, respectively, 
noting any ambiguities. 
 
As discussed in the methodological section, two distinct forms of the regression are run for each 
indicator. In the tables, Model 1 presents results from the regression without controls for 
democracy levels, while Model 2 presents results after adding this control. In the case of 
Property Rights, there are two further models, 1A and 2A, that follow the same pattern. These 
models use a different form of autocorrelation correction, as discussed earlier.  
 
The reasons for treating democracy levels in this way are discussed in the methodological 
section. To recap, one reason for this approach is that democracy levels may be considered either 
an input to or an output of government, or both. It is not this author’s place to decide how 
precisely to characterize democracy, and so conclusions will be drawn from careful 
consideration of both models. Further, comparison of results with and without this control 
variable will illustrate the extent to which any institutional resource curse effects diminish when 
controlling for high preexisting institutional quality. This follows the literature of the economic 
resource curse which, as discussed, tends to find that economic resource curse effects vanish 
almost completely when controlling for institutional quality.  
A note on Serial Correlation 
The preferred method for dealing with autocorrelation in an OLS regression with PCSE is to 
include a lag of the dependent variable as an independent variable. This is the approach I 
take whenever possible. A useful effect of this technique is that autocorrelation corrections 
automatically become specific to each panel. In other words, the technique allows me to 
accommodate different levels of autocorrelation in different countries if such differences 
exist. With some variables observations are not available for the entire time range of the 
dataset, and so this method would pose problems by further reducing the number of data 
points and thereby the degrees of freedom of the regression. For two of the three variables 
for which this issue arises (Contestation and Inclusiveness), I have performed regressions 
using an autocorrelation correction technique that does not compromise observations and 
degrees of freedom. For Property Rights I perform both regressions as a form of robustness 
check and because the results from each individual approach are somewhat unclear. !
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E.1. Results Without Controlling for Democracy Levels 
 
I. Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms 
 
Freedom of Speech 
The level of autocorrelation for freedom of speech is somewhat lower than most other variables 
in this study, but still requires correction. The results, without controlling for democracy levels, 
show a large, negative, and highly significant relationship between oil dependence and freedom 
of speech. Considering that the variable runs on a scale from 0 to 2, the coefficient of oil 
dependency (-.023) is large in magnitude. 
 
Freedom of Association 
There is no strong evidence of autocorrelation for this indicator, and so no such correction was 
included. Without controlling for democracy, oil dependency again has a negative, significant 
impact on the level of freedom of association. The magnitude of the coefficient is remarkably 
high once again. 
 
Business Freedoms 
The model shows a highly significant, highly negative impact of oil dependency on business 
freedoms. 
 
Political Terror Scale 
In this case the expected coefficient of oil dependency in this case would be positive, because 
this scale runs from 1 to 5 with 5 being the highest level of political terror suffered by the 
population. Without controlling for democracy, the results do yield a positive coefficient, but the 
effect is not statistically significant; it seems that oil dependency has no meaningful impact on 
political terror practices. 
 
Law and Order 
The effect of oil dependency, without controlling for levels of democracy, is slightly negative 
and statistically significant at the .05 level. 
 
Property Rights 
This indicator suffers from significant autocorrelation. As the number of observations is a 
concern for this variable, I have used both of the discussed methods to correct for this problem. 
The results are notably different. The lagged dependent variable method produces an 
insignificant, but negative, coefficient of oil dependency, while the correlation correction method 
suggests a larger, more significant negative relationship between oil dependence and property 
rights. It is therefore reasonable to say that increased oil dependency may lower levels of 
property rights, but the significance and magnitude of this relationship is unclear. 
 
II. Governmental Processes and Arrangements 
 
Independence of the Judiciary 
Oil dependency, without controls for democracy levels, has a slight negative impact on judicial 
independence, and is significant. It should be noted that the indicator is on a binary 0/1 scale and 
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does not fluctuate often in the data, and so the relative magnitude of oil dependency’s impact is 
actually quite high. 
 
Executive Constraints 
Without controlling for levels of democracy, oil dependency has a large, highly significant 
negative impact on the extent of constraints facing the executive branch of the government. 
 
Absence of Corruption 
The impact of oil dependency is large, negative, and highly significant (at the .01 level). 
Institutions experience higher levels of corruption when national oil rent dependency rises, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Contestation of Government 
The regression, in this casing using the alternative autocorrelation correction technique, yields a 
considerable and fairly significant negative coefficient for oil dependency, meaning that either 
the will or the ability to contest government decisions is eroded by higher reliance on oil rents. 
  
Inclusiveness of Government 
As this data comes from the same source as government contestation, it has the same availability 
constraints and so I again use the alternative serial correlation correction. In this case the impact 
of dependency is highly negative and significant at a high level. Higher oil dependency lowers 
the proportion of the population that participates in political decision-making. 
 
Quality of Government 
For the umbrella variable “Quality of Government” results show a small but significant negative 
impact of oil dependency, without controlling for levels of democracy. Again, there is little 
variation in the sample for this variable, and so the relative magnitude of the effect is actually 
quite large- larger, in fact, than any of the control variables with the exception of the lagged 
dependent variable itself. (I do not attribute to much extra insight to this result, as this variable is 
essentially an aggregation of other indicators, including many similar to those used as dependent 
variables in this study. It is the results of those regressions that are more precise and interesting.) 
 
E.2. Results After Controlling for Democracy Levels 
 
Following the approach outlined earlier it is important and interesting to re-examine these results 
after including a control variable for the extent of democracy in any country-year in the data. It is 
expected that many of the results will weaken or disappear completely, but some may be robust 
to the inclusion. Further, specifying the model in more detail in this way will allow for more 
comfort in using the PCSE method, which is less likely to produce biased estimators when 
models are very well specified.  
 
I. Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms 
 
Freedom of Speech: The model controlling for democracy levels shows a reduced effect of oil 
dependency, but one that remains negative and significance at the .01 level. 
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Freedom of Association: The negative effect of oil dependency, when controlling for democracy 
levels, decreases by an order of magnitude and remains significant, but only at the .1 level. 
 
Business Freedoms: For business freedom, the large, highly significant negative effect of 
dependency is largely robust to inclusion of controls for democracy levels, although the 
magnitude and significance level are both diminished a small degree. 
 
Political Terror Scale: With the addition of a control for the level of democracy, the effect of oil 
dependency on political terror becomes negative, which is puzzling, and remains insignificant. 
 
Law and Order: The negative impact of oil dependency actually increases in magnitude and 
becomes more significant when controlling for democracy levels. 
 
Property Rights: I added the democratic control to each of the two models discussed earlier for 
this indicator, and found that one of the two adjusted regressions has a significant impact for oil 
dependency. In both models the effect was negative, smaller in magnitude, and lesser in 
significance, although in one case the significance level remained better than .05. This suggests 
that the probable negative impact of an increase in oil dependency is dampened but perhaps not 
altogether eliminated by high levels of democracy. 
 
II. Governmental Processes and Arrangements 
 
Independence of the Judiciary: The negative impact of dependency disappears almost 
completely and is no longer significant when controlling for levels of democracy. 
 
Executive Constraints: Both the magnitude and the significance level of oil dependency’s 
negative coefficient are increased when controlling for levels of democracy. 
 
Absence of Corruption: Of all the variables examined, the results for absence of corruption are 
among the most robust to democracy controls. No significance of oil impacts is lost, and the 
magnitude of the coefficient decreases only by a tiny amount. Further, the democracy control is 
not at all significant in the model. This suggests that high levels of democracy do not prevent in 
any way higher natural resource dependency from being translated into higher levels of 
corruption. 
 
Contestation of Government: The small negative impact of dependency disappears almost 
completely and is no longer significant in the model when controlling for levels of democracy. 
 
Inclusiveness of Government: Although it decreases slightly in magnitude and significance, the 
negative impact of oil dependency is for the most part robust to the inclusion of controls for 
democracy levels. The relationship between dependency and government inclusiveness is not 
significant far beyond the .05 level, but is certainly meaningful. It is interesting that these effects 
are more robust to democracy levels than government contestation. 
 
Quality of Government: The relationship between dependency and overall quality of government 
remains intact and is actually identical to the result with no control for democracy levels. 
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F. Discussion 
 
F.1. Results Without Controlling for Democracy Levels 
 
Oil dependency is negative and significant- at levels between .1 and .01- for eleven of the twelve 
tested indicators when not controlling for the extent of democracy. Of these eleven, the only 
variable over which there is some ambiguity is Property Rights. These results are in line with the 
hypothesis that in increase in oil rent dependency, all else equal, results in a decline in 
government and institutional quality across several dimensions. While both the coefficient 
magnitude and the significance of the oil dependency variable vary across indicators, it is 
consistently negative and highly significant. The fact that twelve indicators were tested and only 
one returned a non-significant result is evidence that high oil dependency has a diverse and broad 
range of negative institutional effects, most of which have not been econometrically examined 
before now. Further, the consistently high R-Squared statistics of the regressions both justify the 
use of OLS with PCSEs, and show a high level of explanatory power across the board. 
 
The variable for which oil dependency does not appear to be useful is the Political Terror Scale. 
The regression shows a positive coefficient of oil dependence on Political Terror Scale status, 
but not to any significant extent. (Recall that this was the only indicator that a positive 
coefficient was hypothesized, because the indicator runs in the opposite direction to all others in 
the study). And further, this positive, insignificant relationship vanishes altogether when 
controlling for democracy levels. Why might this be? My intuition is that political terror levels 
have diminished hugely over the last several decades as news has become more global. 
Alternatively, manipulation of citizens by political entities may simply have become subtler and 
less explicit. Any such process would have been independent of any oil effects. Another 
possibility is that highly oil dependent states, while potentially likely to be more abusive, do not 
subject citizens to terror of physical intimidation because they do not need citizen consent to 
capitalize on oil extraction opportunities.  
 
In interpreting and discussing these results, is it important to distinguish between reductions in 
ability and reductions in willingness, and to consider how this might be relevant to oil 
dependency effects on citizen experiences. Up to this point this paper has implicitly assumed that 
negative oil dependency effects are attributable to reductions in ability. What this means is that 
high oil rent dependency leads, for example, to a population with a lower ability to contest 
government decisions, constrain executives, or participate in governance in a meaningful 
manner. It is possible, however, that the findings discussed here are, in some cases, attribute to a 
population with a decreased willingness to contest, constrain and participate in government. Such 
a change is not necessarily at odds with higher levels of oil dependency. It is possible, for 
example, that unusually high oil incomes are used to pacify or placate the population in such a 
way that citizens simply take less of an active, interested role in their own governance.5 It is not 
possible to deduce from a study such as this whether or not such a process exists, but the 
question of ‘Ability versus Willingness’ is nonetheless an important one in determining the real 
consequences of resource dependency. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 One way this might happen is through the severe, sustained lowering of taxes, which is thought to pacify 
populations while weakening the foundation of the relationship between citizens and governing 
institutions. This idea goes back to Karl (1997) and beyond. 
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F.2. Results After Controlling for Democracy Levels 
 
The clearest implication of this set of regressions is that controlling for democracy does not 
change the results very much. Oil dependency effects remain negative and significant most of the 
time, although with some weakening. Results for the following six variables are entirely robust 
to the inclusion of democracy as a control: Business Freedoms, Absence of Corruption, 
Executive Constraints, Inclusive of Government, Law and Order, and Quality of Government. 
This list includes half of the tested indicators. Another three indicators show only a marginal 
reduction in either the magnitude or the significance of the oil dependency coefficient: Freedom 
of Association, Freedom of Speech, and Property Rights. Generally speaking, the addition of the 
democracy control variable does improve R-Squared statistics somewhat, but in few cases is the 
difference very noteworthy. 
 
There are only two variables for which the significance of oil dependency effects vanishes when 
controlling for democracy levels. These indicators are Contestation of Government and 
Independence of the Judiciary. In considering the importance of this observation it is useful to 
compare, for each of the two indicators, the overall utility of the two regressions (with and 
without democracy level). In the case of Contestation of Government, the R-Squared statistic 
more than doubles from 0.436 to over .9 with the inclusion of democracy. This implies that the 
disappearance of oil dependence effects is in this case an important result, not an unfortunate 
accident. In the case of Judicial Independence, however, the R-Squared only rises by 0.007 with 
the addition of controls for democracy (and the oil dependence variable retains a negative sign). 
It is therefore rash to conclude that oil dependence has no significant effect on the independence 
of the judicial branch; this particular relationship may require further investigation. 
 
To reiterate, there is little evidence from these results to suggest that high levels of 
democracy present a great panacea for the negative effects of resource dependency on 
quality of government. This is perhaps the most important implication of the study, other than 
the initial finding that negative resource effects are widespread and strong. It leads directly to the 
following question: 
 
Why do economic effects of the resource curse disappear when controlling for 
institutional quality, but political effects persist? 
High levels of democracy or other proxies for strong institutions tend to prevent the erosion of 
economic growth over time, according to evidence cited earlier in this paper. These results now 
show, however, that democracy and institutional strength do not prevent the erosion of the 
institutions themselves. It is important to ask why and to what extent this is true. It is possible, 
for example, that this relationship does not hold all of the time, and the bar is simply set higher in 
one case than the other- perhaps institutions need to be stronger to prevent their own degradation 
than they need be to prevent the degradation of the economy.  
Or this may be too optimistic and political institutions really are quite incapable of maintaining 
themselves in the face of high natural resource dependency. Why might this be? One simple 
explanation would be that there is no entity that monitors government; while a government may 
supervise economic activity to ensure that resource dependency does not affect growth, there is 
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no higher watchdog capable of monitoring government officials and ensuring that their practices 
do not falter.6 Whatever the explanation, this question certainly merits more investigation. 
F.3. Shortcomings and Reasons for Caution 
It is clear that for all but one of indicators investigated in this study we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that oil dependence negatively influences quality of government. In fact, the 
regression results strongly support these hypotheses. As always, though, it is important not to 
confuse the failure to reject a hypothesis with the ability to accept it. These regression results, 
strong as they may be, do not prove the theory that that higher oil rent dependency necessitates 
lower business freedoms, for example. They merely leave the theory in tact as a strong 
possibility. Indeed, there are two specific reasons to be cautious about these results.  
The first of these is the very nature of the dependent variables themselves. To varying extents, 
these indicators of government quality, structure, and effectiveness are less than perfectly 
precise, at least from an economist’s perspective. Even the most carefully compiled data of this 
sort involve subjective qualification, rather than the unmistakable quantification associated with 
common variables in economic analysis- prices, investment returns, pension funding ratios, and 
the like. In order to score, for example, Kuwait in Law and Order for 1996, a human being at 
some point had to consider what he or she had read, seen and heard before arriving at a certain 
number on a six-point scale. This process applies directly to some of the indicators used in this 
study, and indirectly to those that are functions of other qualitative indicators. It is therefore not 
defensible to draw hard and fast inferences from these results. It is more appropriate to consider 
the results a suggestion of what we might expect true oil dependency effects to look like if there 
were objective, agreed upon quantifications of the various dimensions of government quality.  
A second for caution when interpreting the results of this study is the regression method. As 
discussed earlier, there are compelling reasons to use an Ordinary Least Squares regression with 
Panel-Corrected Standard Errors. Further, the main cause for concern with this technique- the 
zero conditional mean assumption- is alleviated by the results themselves. Recall that the high R-
squared values in the results mean that extremely high proportions of the variation in the various 
dependent variables can be explained by variations of the explanatory and control variables. This 
means that the model is well-specified and does a good job of explaining variation across time 
and- most importantly for the zero conditional mean assumption- across countries. This logic, 
however, is not the end of the matter. Some R-squared statistics are higher than others; it may be 
wise to exercise more caution when interpreting estimates from regressions with lower R-
squared, as these estimates have a somewhat higher likelihood of bias. 
F.4. Conclusions 
 
The obvious interpretation of the various results is that, by and large, oil dependence has 
negative consequences across a range of dimensions of government and institutional quality. 
While previous studies have illustrated this effect for levels of democracy and corruption, few- if 
any- have examined the effects with more detail. Such an extension is valuable because a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&!Some consider the press to be the most powerful, capable overseer of government conduct. Whether or 
high levels of press freedom and coverage of government activity could successfully mitigate the 
degradation of governance is an intriguing question that may deserve attention in the resource literature.!
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government can- some might say should- be evaluated on wider criteria than simply the 
respective presence and absence of democracy and corruption. Moreover, while the debate 
regarding the economic consequences of government structure and quality is ongoing, the 
suggestion that dimensions other than corruption and democracy are important for economic 
outcomes is both prudent and realistic. It is certainly possible that some of the government 
quality variables investigated here are not vital to economic success, but analyses of government 
performance in the face of resource wealth must include more nuanced considerations than 
corruption and democracy alone. 
This is a good reminder that important links remain to be drawn between this study and the 
mainstream resource curse debate. Namely, it would be useful to explore the effects of changes 
in the levels of the specific governance indicators studied here vis-à-vis economic growth. For 
example, it may be the case that while a change in executive constraints has no effect on 
economic growth, changes in business freedoms have a very significant effect. While this study 
may constitute a step toward understanding the role of institutions in the resource curse process, 
the true value of this study and any others like it to the resource curse debate will be somewhat 
unknown until such examinations are performed.  
This is not to say that this study is without consequence. As mentioned earlier, it is important to 
recognize the legitimacy of government quality as a relevant, interesting variable in its own right. 
Though economists, and the national accounting figures for which they are renowned, focus on 
those aspects of wellbeing quantifiable in dollars and cents, economic tools and analysis can be 
employed to make more qualitative points. In this case the immediate point, in terms of 
wellbeing, is that increases in oil dependency lead to decreases in the effectiveness of 
governments, including measures of citizens’ rights and freedoms. These effects are not limited 
to a small subset of countries in isolated periods of time; populations worldwide are vulnerable 
to decreased quality of governance as a result of high dependency on resource extraction. 
 
! 32!
G. References 
 
Data Sources 
 
Cingranelli, David and Richards, David. 2010. The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Humans Rights 
Dataset. Version 2010.04.12. http://www.humanrightsdata.org. 
 
Henisz, Witold, University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. 2009. The Political Constrains 
Index Dataset, http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ 
 
Index Mundi, Historical Crude Oil Monthly Prices, 2010. 
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil-dubai!
 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx 
 
Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers. 2002. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2002. Version p4v2002e [Computer File]. College Park, MD: Center for 
International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland. 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm. 
 
Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. 2009. The 
Quality of Government Dataset, version 17June09. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of 
Government Institute, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se. 
 
U.S. Energy Information Administration: 
 
Crude Oil Historical Spot Prices, 2010.  
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_a.htm 
International Petroleum (Oil) Production, 2010. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/oilproduction.html 
Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers, 2010. Production Costs by Region. 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/frs/frstables.cfm# 
 
 
Articles, Books, and Working Papers 
 
Anthonsen, M., Lofgren, A., Nilsson, K. (2009). Rent Dependency: Bad for quality of 
Government, QoG Working Paper 23, The Quality of Government Institute. 
 
Atkinson, G., Hamilton, K. (2003). Savings, Growth and the Resource Curse Hypothesis, World 
Development, 31: 1793–1807. 
 
Auty, R. M. (2001). The Political Economy of Resource-Driven Growth, European Economic 
Review, 45: 839–846. 
 
! 33!
Barro, R. (1996). Democracy and Growth, Journal of Economic Growth, 1:1-27. 
 
Beck, N. and Katz, J. (1995). What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data, 
American Political Science Review, 89: 634-647. 
 
Beck, N. (2007). From Statistical Nuisance to Serious Modeling: Changing How We Think 
About the Analysis of Time-Series–Cross-Section Data, Political Analysis 15:1–4. 
 
Bulte, E., Damania, R., Deacon, R. (2005). Resource Intensity, Institutions and Development, 
World Development, 33: 1029–1044. 
 
Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning, State Environmental Protection Administration, 
(2006). China Green National Accounting Study Report 2004, available at 
http://english.sepa.gov.cn/zwxx/xwfb/200609/t20060908 _92580.htm. 
 
Frees, E. W. 2004. Longitudinal and Panel Data: Analysis and Applications for the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gradstein, M. (2004). Governance and Growth, Journal of Development Economics, 73: 505–
518. 
 
Helliwell, J. (1994). Empirical Linkages Between Democracy and Economic Growth, British 
Journal of Political Science, 24: 225-248. 
 
Karl, T. (1997). The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
 
Knack, S., and Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests 
Using Alternative Institutional Measures, Economics and Politics, 7: 207-27. 
 
Leite, C. & Weidman, J. (1999). Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption 
and Economic Growth. IMF Working Paper (85). 
 
Mehlum, H., Moene, K., & Torvik, R. (2002). Institutions and Thhe Resource Curse, Working 
Paper, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo. 
 
Repetto R, Wells M, Beer G, and Rossini F. (1987). Natural Resource Accounting for Indonesia. 
Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.  
 
Ross, M. L. (2001). Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, 53(3): 325-61. 
 
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (1997). Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth. 
Working Paper Series WP 5398, NBER, Cambridge. 
 
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. M. (2001). The Curse of Natural Resources, European Economic 
Review, 45: 827–838. 
! 34!
 
Solorzano, R., de Camino, R., Woodward, R., Tosi, J., Watson, V., Vasquez, A., Villalobos, C., 
Jimenez, J., Repetto, R., Cruz, W. (1991). Accounts Overdue: Natural Resource Depreciation in 
Costa Rica,” Tropical Science Center, San Jose, Costa Rica, and World Resources Institute, 
Washington, DC. 
 
Wilson, S. and Butler, D. (2004). A Lot To Do: The Promise and Peril of Panel Data in Political 
Science, Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Brigham Young University.
! 35!
Appendix: Selected Data Tables and Regression Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2: Oil Rents by Country, 1987-2008, in Billions of 2008 US $
 
1987 4.137 1.613 2.626 5.979 4.749 8.121 5.842 3.484 9.913 4.688 2.381 16.407 5.920 5.889 22.370 6.354
1988 3.482 1.411 2.153 2.752 2.891 7.535 5.281 3.611 8.284 4.370 0.883 18.651 5.668 1.799 9.294 5.759
1989 5.416 1.636 2.603 4.344 7.194 12.530 8.311 5.237 9.603 7.622 2.710 24.590 8.807 3.447 16.231 6.674
1990 7.536 2.450 3.862 7.230 10.970 19.540 7.746 8.129 14.072 10.495 4.336 44.056 14.134 4.983 31.139 10.640
1991 6.359 2.028 3.213 3.678 7.560 18.361 1.047 7.062 12.067 8.814 1.447 48.067 13.841 1.471 21.096 9.618
1992 6.066 2.215 3.054 5.656 7.961 13.333 4.158 6.589 11.624 8.741 2.508 34.658 9.243 2.305 25.759 9.345
1993 4.832 2.073 2.691 5.072 8.456 14.657 7.739 5.176 10.065 7.274 3.491 36.298 9.407 3.138 18.065 8.444
1994 4.891 2.487 3.117 4.800 8.795 14.326 8.248 5.246 11.019 7.171 4.721 35.502 9.139 4.640 17.300 9.755
1995 6.652 2.743 3.277 6.253 10.734 16.677 9.706 7.054 10.897 9.869 6.610 41.527 10.773 6.403 23.764 10.567
1996 7.294 3.805 4.794 8.953 14.079 20.696 11.894 7.589 15.258 10.522 11.781 51.015 13.471 10.511 34.243 14.711
1997 7.247 3.283 3.998 9.195 13.855 19.369 11.024 7.595 12.412 10.805 10.588 48.839 12.883 9.060 29.781 12.758
1998 4.988 1.365 1.882 4.744 7.771 12.657 7.541 5.151 5.213 7.683 2.935 32.373 8.608 2.722 10.420 5.075
1999 6.845 3.401 5.589 8.700 11.273 19.437 10.834 6.764 13.111 10.493 10.765 47.816 12.547 10.199 24.337 12.153
2000 11.983 5.536 10.269 17.473 21.442 34.795 20.336 11.873 23.032 17.527 24.766 87.562 23.770 18.952 58.645 23.036
2001 10.371 5.189 9.299 13.306 19.042 28.773 16.095 9.499 21.145 15.045 19.889 69.334 18.930 15.076 42.737 19.747
2002 10.507 5.048 10.219 13.866 19.809 26.510 15.270 9.229 20.954 14.168 20.621 66.271 17.955 15.808 46.002 17.052
2003 15.383 5.946 12.643 15.159 24.821 34.765 20.573 12.092 26.151 18.556 22.145 91.394 24.133 16.181 53.508 17.729
2004 22.138 8.204 18.375 26.049 32.891 50.020 30.656 17.813 38.261 26.249 32.192 127.922 33.720 20.889 75.095 28.390
2005 34.912 10.683 27.210 38.314 55.935 75.511 47.602 28.745 50.657 43.935 43.926 197.683 50.678 27.456 108.380 38.379
2006 43.497 12.734 34.282 48.846 68.727 75.655 48.838 37.077 58.899 50.076 51.207 194.495 53.703 30.998 127.934 44.558
2007 47.668 12.902 36.376 55.854 72.559 86.902 56.364 40.459 56.507 51.602 52.361 220.768 63.499 34.363 133.109 43.109
2008 66.383 19.203 58.701 83.649 101.856 121.999 80.117 57.106 77.209 66.049 70.437 315.109 89.034 45.241 185.706 64.055
Source: Authors calculations. See Section D.1 for data sources.
KuwaitAlgeria Argentina Brazil Canada China Iran Libya Mexico Nigeria Saudi ArabiaNorway
United 
StatesUAE
United 
Kingdom Venezuela
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Table 3: Oil Rents as Percent of GDP, 1987-2008
1987 4.48% 1.04% 0.29% 0.70% 0.94% 6.54% 17.17% 5.07% 1.78% 7.70% 0.95% 7.35% 9.95% 0.37% 0.29% 4.04%
1988 3.84% 0.93% 0.24% 0.31% 0.51% 6.93% 17.08% 4.95% 1.47% 6.63% 0.35% 7.67% 9.77% 0.11% 0.11% 3.45%
1989 5.69% 1.15% 0.28% 0.47% 1.22% 10.80% 19.92% 7.25% 1.63% 10.82% 1.07% 10.10% 12.80% 0.20% 0.19% 4.34%
1990 7.81% 1.74% 0.43% 0.78% 1.79% 13.54% 23.44% 13.53% 2.27% 13.00% 1.67% 16.59% 15.70% 0.29% 0.36% 6.47%
1991 6.67% 1.29% 0.35% 0.41% 1.12% 11.12% 4.47% 9.89% 1.87% 10.98% 0.54% 16.45% 15.08% 0.09% 0.25% 5.28%
1992 6.26% 1.27% 0.34% 0.62% 1.01% 7.73% 8.75% 9.49% 1.73% 10.85% 0.91% 11.31% 9.80% 0.14% 0.29% 4.82%
1993 5.09% 1.11% 0.28% 0.54% 0.92% 8.64% 10.78% 7.74% 1.47% 8.84% 1.23% 11.85% 10.19% 0.18% 0.20% 4.34%
1994 5.20% 1.26% 0.31% 0.49% 0.83% 8.47% 10.50% 7.70% 1.54% 8.63% 1.57% 11.51% 9.23% 0.26% 0.18% 5.13%
1995 6.80% 1.42% 0.31% 0.62% 0.91% 9.60% 12.19% 11.67% 1.62% 11.92% 2.11% 13.44% 10.21% 0.34% 0.24% 5.34%
1996 7.18% 1.87% 0.44% 0.87% 1.07% 11.07% 14.85% 12.23% 2.15% 12.07% 3.57% 15.95% 12.08% 0.55% 0.34% 7.45%
1997 7.05% 1.48% 0.36% 0.86% 0.95% 10.01% 13.42% 12.33% 1.63% 12.05% 3.04% 14.87% 10.63% 0.46% 0.28% 6.05%
1998 4.61% 0.59% 0.17% 0.42% 0.49% 6.36% 8.84% 8.40% 0.65% 8.33% 0.82% 9.58% 7.10% 0.13% 0.09% 2.40%
1999 6.12% 1.52% 0.50% 0.74% 0.66% 9.58% 12.93% 10.98% 1.57% 11.33% 2.94% 14.25% 10.02% 0.48% 0.21% 6.09%
2000 10.48% 2.50% 0.88% 1.40% 1.15% 16.26% 23.14% 18.56% 2.58% 17.92% 6.55% 24.83% 16.63% 0.86% 0.49% 11.11%
2001 8.83% 2.45% 0.78% 1.05% 0.94% 12.95% 18.27% 15.49% 2.37% 14.12% 5.16% 19.55% 13.02% 0.67% 0.35% 9.20%
2002 8.52% 2.64% 0.84% 1.06% 0.89% 11.05% 16.81% 15.24% 2.33% 10.48% 5.27% 18.67% 12.02% 0.68% 0.38% 8.65%
2003 11.61% 2.83% 1.02% 1.14% 1.00% 13.45% 18.73% 17.37% 2.86% 12.31% 5.60% 23.77% 14.24% 0.68% 0.43% 9.69%
2004 15.84% 3.56% 1.40% 1.89% 1.19% 18.36% 25.05% 24.47% 4.02% 15.57% 7.82% 31.52% 17.97% 0.85% 0.58% 12.68%
2005 23.71% 4.21% 2.01% 2.70% 1.82% 26.43% 34.76% 35.42% 5.15% 24.66% 10.38% 46.00% 24.79% 1.10% 0.81% 15.37%
2006 28.95% 4.59% 2.43% 3.34% 1.97% 24.93% 33.83% 42.62% 5.68% 26.36% 11.83% 43.89% 23.81% 1.20% 0.93% 16.00%
2007 30.78% 4.25% 2.44% 3.71% 1.81% 26.39% 38.06% 43.34% 5.26% 25.41% 11.71% 48.06% 26.36% 1.29% 0.94% 14.18%
2008 41.58% 5.88% 3.73% 5.54% 2.31% 35.38% 50.68% 57.07% 7.10% 30.81% 15.44% 65.43% 34.23% 1.69% 1.30% 20.05%
Source: Authors calculations. See Section D.1 for data sources.
Norway Saudi Arabia UAE
United 
Kingdom
United 
States VenezuelaAlgeria Argentina Brazil Canada China Iran Kuwait Libya Mexico Nigeria
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 Notes:  1. Estimated coefficients are reported with standard errors included below in parentheses. 
   2. Significance levels: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Table 4 Part I: Regression Results for Indicators of Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms 
 
Variables Freedom of Speech Freedom of Association Business Freedoms Political Terror Scale 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
-0.023*** -0.010*** -0.045*** -0.004* -0.176*** -0.102** 0.003 -0.008 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.063) (0.043) (0.006) (0.006) 
Oil 
Dependency 
        
0.539*** 0.264***   0.815*** 0.758*** 0.573*** 0.525*** 
(0.069) (0.072)   (0.060) (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) 
3rd Lag of 
Dependent 
Variable         
Income 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.013*** 0.000 0.092*** 0.058*** -0.018*** -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.032) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) 
         
Oil Prices 0.003 -0.001 0.013*** 0.001 0.068*** 0.051*** 0.003 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.018) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) 
         
Middle East -0.168** 0.120** -0.773*** -0.114* -2.1 0.962 0.038 -0.154 
 (0.070) (0.051) (0.095) (0.064) (1.486) (2.144) (0.110) (0.098) 
         
Democracy  0.124***  0.208***  0.829**  -0.062*** 
  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.409)  (0.018) 
         
Constant 0.414*** 0.059 0.907*** -0.097* 9.013** 8.183** 1.482*** 1.940*** 
 (0.095) (0.077) (0.032) (0.055) (3.904) (3.350) (0.227) (0.290) 
         
R-Squared 0.666 0.742 0.532 0.803 0.763 0.772 0.761 0.775 
Chi-Squared 570.095 1583.051 687.537 4754.56 441.731 529.728 870.209 1070.253 
P-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Notes:  1. Estimated coefficients are reported with standard errors included below in parentheses. 
  2. Significance levels: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Table 4 Part II: Regression Results for Indicators of Citizens’ Rights and Freedoms 
 
Variables Law and Order Property Rights 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1A Model 2A 
-0.014** -0.022*** -0.390*** -0.318** -0.131 -0.052 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.127) (0.138) (0.094) (0.094) 
Oil 
Dependency 
          
0.643*** 0.664***   0.822*** 0.779*** 
(0.075) (0.077)   (0.044) (0.046) 
3rd Lag of 
Dependent 
Variable       
Income 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.831*** 0.708*** 0.174*** 0.151*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.054) (0.070) (0.049) (0.050) 
       
Oil Prices 0 0.002 -0.107*** -0.108*** 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.036) (0.036) (0.026) (0.028) 
           
Middle East 0.287** 0.146 -3.22 3.76 -5.389*** -2.463* 
 (0.120) (0.113) (5.076) (4.912) (1.642) (1.436) 
       
Democracy  -0.045**   1.652***   0.897*** 
  (0.020)  (0.510)  (0.234) 
         
Constant 1.326*** 1.477*** 44.680*** 36.447*** 4.094** 0.965 
 (0.328) (0.343) (2.794) (4.048) (1.930) (1.684) 
           
R-Squared 0.696 0.701 0.654 0.678 0.915 0.924 
Chi-Squared 643.268 657.492 440.695 411.075 7501.546 11403.549 
P-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Notes:  1. Estimated coefficients are reported with standard errors included below in parentheses. 
  2. Significance levels: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Table 5 Part I: Regression Results for Governmental Processes and Arrangements 
 
Variables Independence of the Judiciary Executive Constraints Absence of Corruption 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
-0.004** -0.001 -0.010** -0.013*** -0.265*** -0.259*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.066) (0.057) 
Oil 
Dependency 
      
0.743*** 0.663*** 0.861*** 0.416*** 0.697*** 0.695*** 
(0.084) (0.102) (0.032) (0.071) (0.063) (0.070) 
3rd Lag of 
Dependent 
Variable       
Income 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005** 0.001 0.247*** 0.244*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.048) (0.042) 
       
Oil Prices -0.002 -0.003** 0.000 0.003** 0.037 0.039 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.027) (0.032) 
       
Middle East 0.052 0.123** -0.323** 0.159 0.935 1.118 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.137) (0.117) (1.336) (0.951) 
       
Democracy  0.024**  0.315***  0.066 
  (0.010)  (0.041)  (0.262) 
       
Constant 0.091** -0.002 0.720*** 0.859*** 8.299*** 7.951*** 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.169) (0.151) (2.490) (1.980) 
       
R-Squared 0.757 0.764 0.919 0.952 0.896 0.895 
Chi-Squared 3243.223 14161.954 16367.392 57768.127 4479.772 5588.943 
P-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Notes:  1. Estimated coefficients are reported with standard errors included below in parentheses. 
  2. Significance levels: * denotes p<0.1, ** denotes p<0.05, and *** denotes p<0.01. 
Table 5 Part II: Regression Results for Governmental Processes and Arrangements 
 
Variables Contestation of Government Inclusiveness of Government Quality of Government 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
-0.039** -0.008 -0.041** -0.028** -0.002** -0.002** 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.017) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) 
Oil 
Dependency 
      
  0.681*** 0.541*** 0.804*** 0.795*** 
  (0.080) (0.099) (0.046) (0.054) 
3rd Lag of 
Dependent 
Variable       
Income 0.025*** 0.001* 0.000 -0.007*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 0.000 0.000 
       
Oil Prices 0.018** 0.004 0.026*** 0.018** 0 0 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009) 0.000 0.000 
       
Middle East -1.184*** 0.137** -0.157 0.018 0.014 0.014 
 (0.172) (0.054) (0.194) (0.187) (0.013) (0.014) 
       
Democracy  0.308***  0.099*** - 0.000 
  (0.008)  (0.026) - (0.002) 
       
Constant -0.037 -1.439*** -0.139 -0.501*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 
 (0.150) (0.118) (0.175) (0.193) (0.030) (0.031) 
       
R-Squared 0.436 0.954 0.806 0.831 0.873 0.872 
Chi-Squared 233.368 3166.875 558.572 1387.793 2935.474 2758.87 
P-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 
